Computationally Secure Optical Transmission Systems with Optical
  Encryption at Line Rate by Engelmann, Anna & Jukan, Admela
1Computationally Secure Optical Transmission
Systems with Optical Encryption at Line Rate
Anna Engelmann and Admela Jukan
Abstract—We propose a novel system for optical encryption
based on an optical XOR and optical Linear Feedback Shift
Register (oLFSRs). Though we choose LFSR for its ability to
process optical signals at line rate, we consider the fact that it
offers no cryptographic security. To address the security shortfall,
we propose implementation of parallel oLFSRs, whereby the
resulting key-stream at line rate is controlled electronically by a
nonlinear random number generator at speeds much lower than
the optical line rate, which makes the system practically relevant.
The analysis of computational security shows that the proposed
system is secure against wiretapping and can be engineered with
the state of the art optical components.
I. INTRODUCTION
Making all-optical encryption practical today would require
two basic components: an optical encryption component and
an optical key generator. For their realization, not only these
components need to be developed but also significant system
design obstacles need to be overcome, whereby the main
challenge is encryption and key generation at the optical
channel line rate. It is therefore that in today’s systems, the
payload of an OTN container is encrypted in the electronic
layer and the so-called Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
does not perform encryption and decryption at line speed [1].
Currently, two state-of-the-art optical components can help
implement all-optical encryption system at line speed: optical
XOR and optical Linear Feedback Shift Register (oLFSRs).
Optical XOR has been proposed for encryption, as it can
easily concatenate plaintext with a key [2]–[5]. For optical
key generation, no solution currently exist. Our idea to use
an oLFSR for key generation at line speed falls short, on the
other hand, since the LFSR-based ciphers are known for their
weak cryptographic security due to the linear properties [6].
Since LFSR is simple to implement all-optically based on the
concatenated optical XORs and a shift register [4], [7], we
here address the fundamental security shortfall.
We propose a new and practical solution towards optical
encryption and key generation, based on parallel oLFSRs,
which are controlled and periodically reseeded by a pseudo
random number generator (RNG) at speeds much lower than
the rate of optical channel, which makes the system practically
relevant. Under these assumptions and presence of guessing
wiretapper in optical network, we analyze the computational
security of the proposed system and derive important system
parameters, including the minimal polynomial degree and
the number of different polynomials required for oLFSR
implementation, the optimal key length generated by oLFSR,
and the implementation overhead. The results show that the
proposed optical encryption system provides high level of
computational security and thus carries promise for further
studies.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig.1 illustrates the optical transmission system envisioned.
As the optical network usually encompass both the data plane,
and from the data plane a separated control plane, we assume
that the control plane is able to monitor information about
network topology, assign wavelengths, and control the con-
figuration of the encryption and key generation components.
However, the control plane does not distribute the actual ses-
sion keys, but only the synchronization signal for the Pseudo
Random Number Generator (RNG) for random selection of
parameters for session key generation and interleaving of
original data in end-systems prior to data encryption. The bit
interleaving can be defined and configured by control plane
for each end-to-end connection and is required to preliminary
hide the content of optical data as well as to force an attacker
to decrypt a whole wiretap data for content recovery.
In the source, the original optical bit stream M is interleaved
and virtually split into multiple optical units m. Each optical
data m is encrypted with the key k from the Optical Key
Generator (OKG). This is done by applying optical XOR.
The encrypted m′ is sent to the optical transmission channel
provisioned. When any encrypted parts m′ of M reaches the
destination, it is decrypted with key k and converted into
electronic signal for following deinterleaving, i.e., recovering
of original data. Due to the fact that RNG in source and
destination are synchronized, both generate the same pseudo
random numbers, i.e., generator polynomials c∗ and seeds h
to define and initialize LFSR, respectively. As a result, OKG
generates the same keys k for en- und decryption.
We propose to use all-optical XOR gate [5], [8], [9] for
encryption. From the security perspective, the XOR operation
transforms the original data into encrypted data and, thus, can
prevent wiretapping, whereby each incoming plaintext m of
length Lm in source is mixed, i.e., XOR concatenated, with a
session key k of length Lk into encrypted data m′ = [m⊕ k]
of the length Lm′ = Lm. The encrypted data m′ is decrypted
at the destination as m′ ⊕ k = m ⊕ k ⊕ k = m. Here,
the ultrafast nonlinear interferometers based on semiconductor
optical amplifiers (SOAs) can be used to combine two optical
streams at line rate up to 160Gb/s [5], whereby transverse
electric (TE) and transverse magnetic (TM) components of a
probe pulse can be split and recombine by setting the relative
optical delays between them. The two data modulated pulsed
signals to undergo XOR operation, secret m and key k, are
assumed to have equal bit rate up to 160Gb/s.
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2Fig. 1: All-optical transmission system with encryption capability. k: generated key of length Lk; m: secret message of length
Lm; m′: encrypted message of length Lm′ ; M : original optical data of length LM = N · Lm
A. Key generation with oLFSR
LFSR has been traditionally used for random number gen-
eration [6], [10] and not for key generation, due to the known
weak cryptographic security. In its basic configuration, as
illustrated in Fig. 2a based on [4], the shift register has a
fixed size of g bits, whereby the seed h of g bits presents the
initial sequence. From this register, a set of fixed bits denoted
as i and j, corresponding to the generator polynomial c∗, are
XOR concatenated and the resulting bit is fed to the shift
register at the last position (g). After that, the sequence in the
register is 1-bit shifted. To address the issue of weak security,
we use a nonlinear pseudo RNG at comparably lower line rate
in combination with parallel LFSRs, and deploy reseeding of
LFSR during key generation. With a proper choice of system
parameters, we later show that we are able to implement a
secure key generation.
Fig. 2b illustrates the key generation. To generate a session
key k, OKG uses a generator polynomial c∗ of degree g
and seed h, both randomly selected by RNG. Since RNGs in
source and destination are synchronized, i.e., able to generate
the same polynomials c∗ and seeds h, the key generated
can be infinitely long. We propose to utilize P generator
polynomials to assign the same number of corresponding
parallel oLFSR, whereby each polynomial corresponds to one
oLFSR configuration. In our system, a randomly selected seed
h is forwarded towards its corresponding oLFSR as selected
by an optical 1 : P switch. The resulting optical signal from
that oLFSR is finally forwarded as an encryption key k to the
optical XOR. It should be noted that the RNG provides a true
secret key stream at lower line rates, i.e., electronic bit streams
at rate CRNG ≤ 1.3 Gbit/s [11], [12] to define generator
polynomial (oLFSR) and seeds. The oLFSR allows us to
extend this secret to a comparably longer optical encryption
key k, namely at line rates of COKG ≤ 250 Gbit/s [3]. Thus,
oLFSR makes it possible to adapt the length and bit rate of
true secret key at the optical line rate, which is the system
salient feature.
In summary, the system proposed addresses the issue of
weak cryptographic security of the LFSR through the follow-
ing simple system modifications, including use of: (1) different
generator polynomials c∗ of any degrees g, and (2) randomly
selected seeds h to start off the LFSR; (3) reseeding, i.e.,
periodical selecting of new seeds during generation of cer-
tain key with defined polynomial, and (4) implementation of
reconfigurable OKG with parallelized LFSRs. The reseeding
can help us to increase the amount and randomness of bit
Fig. 2: Key generation with oLFSRs. c∗: bit stream to define
primary oLFSR; h: seed as a bit stream of length g;
sequence generated by RNG, whereby RNG can generate new
seed continuously or periodically, depending on configuration;
for instance, the triggering can be configured by the control
plane to occur periodically. It should be noted that using
different polynomials with optical components is a challenge.
As already studied elsewhere, in a system with different
polynomials implemented in electronics, each polynomial
would have to be implemented as a separate LFSR [3] or
by extending of logic gates [10], which does not scale. The
idea of parallel oLFSR and optical switching thus replaces
the need for periodical polynomial reconfiguration, which can
today only be implemented in electronics. While the chosen
oLFSR generates a part of an infinite long session key, RNG
can then define the next random seed for its initialization, to
be cyclically reseeded, etc.
B. Attacker Model
We analyze the wiretapping attack, whereby the attacker is
always able to access the fiber link and, thus, any encrypted
part m′. Due to bit interleaving of data M before optical
encryption, the secret content can be only revealed, if a
whole optical data M is decrypted and deinterleaved. Thus,
the attacker must guess any secret keys k first. In case an
attacker can access the end system and analyze the generation
technique of session key, the probability for breaking the LFSR
at the first try is 100%: an attacker is able to break LFSR based
on generator polynomial of degree g with a time complexity
defined as O(g2)) and memory complexity O(2g), if receiving
32g bits generated by LFSR. Considering this weakness, we
assume that the attacker already knows the structure of OKG
based on LFSRs. All that is left then to guess a correct
generator polynomials and correct sequence of seeds.
III. SYSTEM ANALYSIS
This section focuses on computational security, i.e., com-
plexity to find out the right generator polynomial and the
right sequence of seeds utilized to generate k. We analyze the
required number of parallel LFSRs P and number of required
reseeds N to make the system computationally secure. We
also discuss bounds of the parameters required for OKG
implementation.
A. Security analysis
For the analysis, we assume that all primitive irreducible
polynomials of any degree are known and can be utilized for
initialization of oLFSR. We assume that RNG can randomly
select one out of P ≤ ϕ(2g − 1)/g generator polynomials of
any degree g, gmin ≤ g ≤ gmax, where ϕ(x) is Euler function.
Generally, the minimal degree gmin should be defined so that
the key length generated by LFSR is larger than the length
of secret data m encrypted by this key k, i.e., Lm ≤ Lk <
2gmin−1 and gmin ≥ log2(Lk+1), to avoid the cyclic repeat
of a key. However, due to the fact that the length of optical
data M can be very large, i.e., multiples of Lm, LM = N ·Lm,
we can relax the condition gmin ≥ log2(LM +1) for minimal
polynomial degree gmin as follows gmin ≥ log2(LMN + 1),
where N describes the number of reseeds.
When utilizing polynomials of any degree g, the param-
eters c∗ and h of length g are chosen randomly, and kept
secret. Thus, the entropy of true secret key can be defined as
H1(kRNG) = log(P (2
g − 1)), while one out of P existing
generator polynomials of degree g and a seed out of (2g − 1)
can be selected for generation of encryption key k. From the
attacker’s perspective, the session key k can be an arbitrary
bit sequence out of 2Lm′ possible ones, i.e., the entropy can
be defined as H2(k) = Lm′ bits. Generally, an attacker can
follow the algorithm for generation of key k and, thus, either
guess any c∗ and h, or directly guess a bit sequence k of
length Lm′ . In the former case, the equivocation is defined
as H1(k|m′) = log2(P (2g − 1)) = H1(kRNG). In the latter
case, H2(k|m′) = Lm′ = H2(k). It is faster however to guess
the parameters c∗ and h, if P (2g − 1) < 2Lm′ . Thus, the
equivocation H1(k|m′) must be equal to or larger than entropy
H2(k) for a perfect secrecy [13]. The resulting condition for
a perfect secrecy can be defined as
log2 (P (2
g − 1)) ≥ Lk (1)
Eq. (1) also defines the maximal size of optical data Lm
encrypted before the new cycle of oLFSR reseeding. For a
strong practical security, the system must be unbreakable also
in case of a brute force attacks (BFA), whereby the key
computation complexity, i.e., time overhead, must be high.
Since an attacker must check all combinations of polynomials
and seeds, the time required to break the proposed system is
TBFA = N · τ · P · (2g − 1), (2)
where τ is a time required for decryption with one key guessed
by the attacker, while key guessing time (generation of one
binary sequence k with known LFSR) is assumed as zero,
and N is a number of reseeds. Since secret optical data flow
M is, generally, larger than the optimal key length defined
by Eg. (1), i.e., LM > Lk = Lm, the oLFSR must be either
reseeded every time Lm bits of optical data are encrypted.
Thus, the number of key reseeds N depends on optimal key
length Lk and data flow length LM and can be defined as
N = LM/Lk (3)
When generator polynomials utilized in our system are prede-
fined and oLFSR could be generated on the fly (which would
only be possible in electronics), they also need to be stored.
The buffer size required is a function of degree g:
S = P (g + 1) (4)
B. Discussion on implementation
The utilization of all polynomials of given degree g, are
very hard to implement in practice and especially all-optically.
Thus, we propose to bound P << ϕ(2g − 1)/g primitive
irreducible polynomials of the same degree g to correspond
to all-optical LFSRs and use them in parallel, whereby only
one oLFSR is selected and periodically reinitialized by seed
to generate a part Lk of a session key. Since there is a need
for erasing of shift register (initialization) and for skipping the
first output bits related to random seed, oLFSR initialization
can lead to key generation interruptions and decrease in bit
rate of OKG. Thus, there is a need for optical buffer and
controlled signal clocking. However, we envision, that the
oLFSR initialization will be most efficient, when another
oLFSR based on the same generator polynomial is generating
a key, whereby the duration of key generation period must be
at least the same as duration of oLFSR initialization. To this
end, we propose to relax the condition for optimal key length
defined by Eq. (1), as Lk = n · g, n ≥ 1, and analyze next the
practical security of proposed reseeding method.
Let us now reverse engineer the number of oLFSRs and
its length required given the time needed for a possible BFA,
where TBFA is set to a very large number of years and the
time for one decoding try τ is defined by the state of the art
technology and known. When the OKG consists only of P
oLFSRs (each implementing one polynomial of degree g), the
Eq. (2) can be modified as TBFA ≤ N · τ P (2g − 1), where
the number of required reconfigurations is defined by Eq.(3)
and with Lk = n · g modified as N = LM/n · g. As a result,
boundary condition for strong practical security is defined as
n · TBFA
τLMP
≤ 2
g − 1
g
, (5)
where the number of parallel oLFSRs P is limited as 2 ≤
P ≤ ϕ(2g − 1)/g and 1 ≤ n ≤ 2g−1g .
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we show the numerical results for the previ-
ous analysis. First, we consider all possible generator polyno-
mials of degrees from 10 to 45, i.e., P =
∑45
g=10 ϕ(2
g−1)/g.
To define a range of required generator polynomials, i.e., c∗,
we focus on two case studies: C1) gmin = 10 is fixed and gmax
is variable; C2) gmax = 45 is fixed and gmin is variable. We
assumed that optical bit flow M has a size LM = 1.25 Gbits
4Fig. 3: Optimal key length Lk and nr. of resets N vs. g.
(e.g., an OTN transmission unit) and decryption time τ=10−18
sec based on data from Aurora [14] at 180 Petaflops.
Fig. 3 shows optimal key length Lk defined by Eq.(1)
and the required number of key reseeds N as a function of
polynomial degree g. For C2, Lk is constant (around 84 bits)
for any g := gmin. For C1, the optimal key length Lk increases
with increasing gmax. However, the key length directly defines
the number of reseeds. In contrast to C2, where N is minimal
and constant, the number of reseeds, in case of C1, decreases
with increasing gmax.
Fig. 4 shows the time (in years) required to decode a
wiretapped optical data of size LM in case of Brute Force
Attack (BFA) calculated with Eq. (2) as well as the storage
required in the node. As it can be seen, a prohibitively long
time of over 200 years can be measured in case of C1 for
g = 37. In this case, around 24 GByte additional storage is
required to store the generator polynomials. In C2, an attacker
requires more than 1.8·108 years to decrypt a whole data flow,
whereby this time is constant for all gmin = g. On the other
hand, it requires prohibitively large storage of 104 Gbyte. In
general, larger the polynomial degree g better the security.
Fig. 5 shows the boundary conditions for practical real-
ization of all-optical key generator based on a few generator
polynomials. It shows the minimal required polynomial degree
as a function of amount of parallel oLFSRs and the key length
generated prior to the reseed. Here, we assumed the duration
of BFA as 1013 years, as in case of BFA on AES key of length
128 bits (calculated under assumptions made). The increasing
length of key generated Lk = ng with the same seed increases
the required polynomial degree g. However, the increasing
number of parallel oLFSRs utilized decreases the polynomial
degree required. For example, OKG based on only 3 oLFSR
(g=106) can provide the same time complexity for BFA as
OKG based on 2 oLFSRs of the same length, if the maximal
key length Lk generated between reseeds is bounded as 8g
and 5g, respectively.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed for the first time to utilize all-optical XOR
technique for encryption in the optical layer at line rate, with
a technique based on parallel all-optical LFSRs for generation
of infinite long key. We showed that using different gener-
ator polynomials of defined degree, which are periodically
reseeded, can provide a high practical security of optical data
transmitted. The main results of this study is that the all-optical
implementation of the key generator which is based on only
Fig. 4: Duration of BFA and required storage vs. g.
Fig. 5: Polynomial degree vs. key length vs. nr. of oLFSRs.
3 optical LFSRs of an optimized length of 106 bits provides
high computational security (BFA takes 1013 years), whereby
848 bits of the key can be generated without reseeding.
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